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A STUDY ON THE LIABILITY FOR TORTS 
By MASAO ISHIMOTO. 
1. 
In modern countries “the principle of liabi1ty with fa叫t"is 
principally adopted in laws on liabi1ty for torts. Artic1e 709 of 
the Japanese Civi1 Law prescribes that “a person who violates 
another's rights intentionally or neg1igently. is liable to the 
compensation for any damage caused by his act"， and the French 
Civil Law and German CiviI Law， the mother laws of the Japanese干
Civi1 Lawj are aIso essentially simi1ar in principles， although slightly 
di任erentin. expressions; (1) . 
Under this. principle， whether one is liable or not to the 
compensation entirely depends upon the fact whether or not the 
person perpetrated the illegal act intentionally or by fau1t and 
depends also upon the fact whether or not the cause of the damage 
was really due to this illegal act. However~ with the development 
of modern society， the sociallife has become gradually complicated， 
and especially as a result of the rapid progress of large enterprises， 
cases have occurred where various damages had been inflicted to 
others through an act of person in a position which should be 
stated as faultless in previous concept of fault. . Moreover， in the 
objective social norm.consciousness of modern society， when there 
is no reason to hold the person w ho infringed upon rights of others 
responsible by the fact that he is faultless， ithas been acknowledged 
that it is not proper for victims 1:0 bear the damage always. Aa a 
result， theories which impose the liabi1ty to the compensation upon 
the person so-called faultless have been advocated. The so.called 
theory of absolute liabi1ity which has. been advocated for this 
pur・posemay be divided into two categories， dassified according 
to the theoretical construction. The五.rstis to recognize an absolute 
1) Art. 1382. (Code civil)， ~ 823. (BGB). 
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liabi1ty substantially by the presumption of fault， with the pur-
pose of introducing absolute liabi1ity under the form of the liabiIty 
with fault from the standpoint of the interpretation of law. The 
secon迂 theoryis to acknowledge an absolute liabi1ity from a 
di妊erentstandpoint without adhereing to the standpoint of the 
interpretation of law. Rather. the latter has been advocated as 
aalegislative theory outside the irlteTpretat1011of existing law， 
or to arrange the gap of the regulations or to amend a promising 
interpretation of laws adhereing to the principle of liabi1ity with 
fault. The former， aJ.though based upon the tradition of the principle 
of liability with fault， modifies the concrete meaning of the concept 
of fault itself_ This theory inc1udes not on1y the case， inwhicn One 
has been recognized as 、faultyby reason of negligence in taking 
precautions where the result of the act could have been foreseen 
and also cou1d have been avoided if precautions had been taken， 
but also the case where the liabi1ity to the compensetion shall be 
ack包owledgedimmediately. without ascertaining whether or not 
there has been a negligence in taking precaution， by virtue of a 
presumption or a五ctionof the existence of fault when a certain 
result of damage occurred. These theories belong to the former 
category. 
Form the stanpoint of the interpretation of law， this principle 
of presumption or fi.ction .of faults is most interesting， and then 
1 wish to discuss the fundamentals of absolute liability， reviewing 
the theoretical construction of this principle (1). 
II 
The五ctionaltheory of fault had been already advocated in 
Germany， in the middle of the preceeding centnry， and the judicial 
decision of the court of appeal in Munchen on the April 16th， 
1861 is the typical example， inwhich it was said that the railway 
business using alocomotives accompanies with inevitable and con-
stant faulty acts， therefore， the occurrence of damages is .always 
due to the fault in the management. 
The law of Austria in 1869 on the responsibility of railway 
1) This theme was discussed in details in the author's“Study on Civi1 Liability" 
(1948) (Nippon Hyoron sha's Edition)， but the same theme is taken up here frol1 a 
new viewpoint. 
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enterprise recognized the presumption of fault， and the Prussian 
law of 1838 was based on theprinciple of the risk theory. However， 
it is the renowned decision of the French .supreme court in June 
16th. 1896 that has had a great infiuence on present theories and 
has been the ignition-point. of debates in the academic. circ1es 
thereafter (I). The incident concerned with the c1aim of indemnity 
made by the widow. of a technician against the owner of the 
steam ship， inwhich the technician was kil1ed by an. explosion 
of the boi1er on the Loire river near Nantes. The court gave the 
widow a favorable decision applying Artic1e 1386 of the French 
Civil Law， which is similar to Article 717 of the Japanese Civi1 
La w， recognizing the responsibility of the proprietor of the bui1ding 
which has caused damage owning to the defects in the construction. 
The reason for the decision was that the cause of the explosion 
was due to a defect in the part of the boi1er， although the proprietor 
of the ship was not a ware. of it and also was not in a position 
to acknowledge the defect， and then Artic1e 1386 was app1ied. 
However， an appeal to the upper court was made， c1aiming 
that the engine is not a construction and therefore it is a mistake 
in this case to apply Artic1e 1386. Against this， the supreme 
court pointed the section 1 of. Article 1384 of the Civi1 Law， 
stressing that this provision is not simply an exception of Artic1e 
1382， which is hitherto ordinarily presumed， as the principle of 
1iabi1ity for torts， but rather we must interprete in-it that a 
general rule，“a person is responsible not only 、forthe damage 
caused by the act of himself but also for it caused by the 
act of the person for whom he is responsible or by object 
which is under his supervision" has been prescribed， and instead 
of Artic1e 1386， this Artic1e 1384 should be app1ied in this case. 
Thereby it was decided that the proprietor of the ship is responsible 
to the compensation. 
The decision of the supreme court made a wider recognition 
of. absolute 1iabi1ity 'possible by highly weighing the meaning of 
Artic1e 1384 of. the French Civi1 La w from a view point di百erent
from previous theories. Concerning the reason why the la w im. 
poses the responsibi1ity to thepeI:son who supervises the object 
1) PlanioI， Traite. elementaire de droit civi1， tom. deuxieme， Paris， 1905. p. 313. 
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which was the cause of the句damage，irrespective of the existence 
or non-existence of fault， even in the French academic circ1es， 
there are， in general， two opposing exp1anations. One states that 
the existence of fault shou1d bepresumed， and. the other states 
that it is a case of a liabi1ity forrisk. This theory of risk 
stands on the opinion that the theory of presumption of fau1t 
is i:c.complete as an absolute liabi1ity， and it had been advocated 
chiefiy by Sa1ei1es (1) and Josserai1d (2). However， even among 
these two， they differ in opinions. They have been acknow1edged 
generally， .since， compared with the theory of presuIT¥ption or五ction
of fau1t， these theories are more comp1ete and a1so agree with 
the 1ega1 sentiment of the society as principle of responsibi1ity 
for the act of wrong which modern large enterprises accompaniy 
with. And since the Law of Liabi1ity of Labour Accident in 1898 
adopted this principles， they have become a potent theory. 
However， to harmonize this theory with the principle of the 
liabi1ity for torts incode civi1 which stands on the tradition of 
the liabi1ity with fau1t， itis very di缶cu1tto adopt the risk theory 
immediately as a result of law-interpretaticin. Therefore， itis 
believed that the tradition of liabi1ity with fau1t is barely sustained 
conventionally in the 1aw-interpretation in tt.e form of theory of 
fiction， and substantial1y the abso1ute liabi1ity is recognized (3). 
As stated previausly， the theory of absolute liabi1ity was 
inb:oduced as the result of law-interpretation in the French aca-
demic circles. But it is due to the existence of the provision of 
Artic1e 1384， i.e. the provision about the act of object (1e fait 
des choses). However， there is no st1ch provision inthe Japanese 
Givi1 Law. Then it is not prOper to apply the theory of the 
French law directly as the result of an interpretatioI1 of Japanes 
Civi1 Law， but the idea of fiction of fault or the idea of risk， 
stated in these theories， isvery instructive as. itself. So I wish 
to attempt a new interpretation of Artic1e 709 of Japanese Civi1 
Law. 
1) Saleilles， Les accidents du travail et la responsabilite civile， paris， 1897. 
2) Josserand， De laresponsibilite du fait.des choses inanimees， Paris， 1897. 
3) About this process of theoretical development， H.' et L. Mazeaud， Trait色 the-
orique et pratiqe de Ia responsailit基civildelictuelIe etcontractuelle (4 ed. 1948-50， 
Parisふ veryinstructive. 
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III 
It is well known that by the amendment of our civi1 code 
after the war， the following prσvisions were added into Artic1e 1. 
Section 1:“Private rights shall submit to the pub1ic welfare" 
and section 3:“The abuse of rights shall not be tolerated". 
Since 1 have previo11s1y explained the signi丑cance of these 
provisions (1)， 1 wi1 limit disC11ssion: now to the present problem. 
giving corisideration to the liability for torts in relation to these 
problems. The sentence “rights shall submit to the pub1ic 
welfare"， may be explained simply as foI1ows: The lawful use 
of rights does not mean that the formal execution of. rights sh包1
be always protected. absO'lutely， but rather mean that， as the 
result of the execution of rights must agree with the intention 
of la w Or the contents of right recognized by the society， there are 
restricitions that rights must be 11sed not to disturb the peace of 
the society and break the harmony of the general social 1ife. Arid 
this recognition of rights within this restriction indeed signifies 
the sUbmission to the public welfare. So， when a disharmony of 
the social life or a disturbance of the peace is produced by breaking 
these restrictions， there exists the abuse of right. It means that 
rights shall be and must be originally recognized only within these 
limits. Concerriing the question of torts， inwhat state does the 
disturbance of peace and the disharmony exist? It is the case in 
which anyone， by the infringement of bene五tsof others protected 
by Iaw， caused a “damage which is worthy of compensation" 
from the sacial viewpoint irrespective of the subjective state of 
his manner. Contrarily， ifa damage is not caused， although the 
person responsible for the act may have had the intention to 
infringe rights of others， the civi1 liabi1ty is not formed， in other 
words， there is no blame from the viewpoint of the civi1 law. 
According to thearies which have long prevailed， Artic1e 709 
prescribes that a 1iabi1ty to the compensation exists only when a 
damage was caused by the intention' or fault of a person responsi-
ble for the act. If a damage is caused without fault， then as for 
the doer， itis recognized as a result of a lawful execution of 
right， therefore he is not 1iable to any compensation. Consequent1y， 
1) M. Ishimoto， Lecture on CiviJ Law. Vo). 1. (1951， Kyoto) p. 88. 
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the victim must endure the damage. Howeve1'， f1'om the viewpoint 
of the victim， whether 01' not the damage inflicted upon him 
should be. compensated enti1'ely. dep~nds upon the subjective 
state of manne1' on the: part of the 、doer. These facts place the 
protection cif 1'ights by law: in a. ve1'y unstable condition. This 
is nothing but an inevitable result of位leprescribingof liabi1ity 
to t4e compensation by the p1'esent civil law from the viewpoint 
that whethe1' the doe1' is faulty 01' not in his execution of right. 
But on the othe1' harid， if it.， is conside1'ed on the. right of 
victim， itmust be the fundamental idea of the protection of 
p1'operties by law， of the 1'ecognition of 1'ights， that no pe1'son shall 
su丘町damagescaused by othe1's without any 1'eason. Then， when 
damage" had been actually caused by a .pe1'son， if it is over the 
degree of damage which must be .natu1'ally endured fram the 
viewpoint of social life， itmust be 1'ecognized that there has been 
an infringement of rights. Howeve1'， when it is considered in 
connection with Article 709 of the Civn Law， the doe1' wi1l be 
free from the liabi1ity to the compensation if the damage was 
not caused intentionally 01' faulti1y. The1'efo1'e， does it not appear 
that it is more favou1'able to the doer than to the su首位e1' when 
the protection of 1'ight is concerned ? 
The answe1' to this question is none othe1' than the fundam-
ental 1'eason of the p1'inciples of 1iability with fault. The五1'st
1'eason is the 1'ecognition of the old idea involving a thought of 
punishment which is to focus the 1'eprehension by law towards 
the subjective state of manner of the .doer . Itis said that it is 
the traditional ideology since the Roman La w that， simi1ar to the 
criminal liabi1ity， s11ch chastising characteristics should be basic. 
ally recognized in the civil liabi1ity. Naturally; the1'e is a g1'eat 
di旺erencebetween the chastising character of Roman La w On 
torts and that of mode1'n laws. The second reason is the capi-
ta1istic ideology which recognizes the f1'eedom of an individual in 
modern society as much. as possible. In such ideology， as long 
asthere are no faults， torecognize the freedom of action without 
restriction as possible is the necessary order which is requi1'ed for 
the prog1'ess of modern society. These two reasons constitute the 
basic idea of 1'ights of modern times and also are the reason why 
the modern legal 1'ights are said to be individua1istic. Moreover， 
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it was believed that such modern legal order based on such idea 
of right is the order which realizes the pub1ic welfare of the 
modern society. 
Though the infringement of pro五tsof the victim is observed 
again frαm such standpoint， there sti1 should be undoubtedly no 
reason why he shou1dal ways. bear any damage which had been 
in自ictedon. him， ifthere is no reprehension on the part of the 
victim. J ust as there is no reason for the reprehension on the 
doer who had no intention or fault， there is aIso no reason why 
the victim without fau1t should. bear the damage. Jf to tolerate 
an activity of a doer without 1imiting the individual freedom 
as much as possible should be the demand of modern Iegal 
order systematizing on the concept of rights， then analogically， to 
recognize a wide sphere of protection of rights of individuals 
as much as possible， in order to avoid infringement of profits 
which are protected by law， should also be the damand of modern 
legal. order systematizing on the concept of rights. Obse1'ving 
from such standpoint， itis not app1'opriate to sea1'ch for the 
fnndamental ground of the principle of 1iabi1ity with fault within 
the legal idea itself， which is based on individual rights of modern 
law. It is because that， standing on the legal conception based on 
TIghts， the suppo1't of 1'ights of the doer and that of the victim 
wi1 beactually led into self"contradiction as stated above， and the 
mo1'e the right of the doer is defended the deepe1' the self-
contradiction becomes. Therefore， ifto give a protection only in 
favour of a doer is the ground fo1' the 1'ea1ization of public welf-
are of modern society， then the so・calledpub1ic welfare is only 
one-sided and not real1y pub1ic or social in nature. 
The so崎calledpublic we1fare in Artic1e 1 inCivi1 La w natu-
rally means not partial but total or social welfare. Therefore， 
each person must be fairly and equally protected unde1' the law. 
So the :dghts of both， the doer and the victim， are essentially the 
same， and shouldbe recognized as having the same value. The 
legal relatiori formed by the mutual combination of these rights 
should al ways be a relation of mutually harmonized peaceful 
orde1' of each c1aimant. Therefore， only as long as the relation 
of this peaceful o1'der is not broken， any execution of rights is 
the lawful execution， and when this order is broken， there exists 
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an abuse of right. Under the preceding civil law， such destroy-
ing of peace is nothing but the arising of “unbearable damage"， 
and so， as long as such damage is c'aused， theabuse of right 
exis1.s. It js indeed sueh state of rights that proc1aims “rights 
shall submit to the pub1ic welfareぺ
The next problem is how. Artic1e 709 of Civil Law should 
be i:riterpreted in connection with the provision .of Article 1 of Civil 
Law， which prescribes the' fore-mentioned state of i'ghts and a 
prohibition of its abuse. 
As mentioned previously， wemay cqndude' that the right has 
been abused if the doer had caused an unbearabledamage， in 
other word， a damage to be compensated. However， should the 
doer without fault， in such ease， be free from a liabi1ity to the 
compensation in accordance with Artic1e 709 of Civi1 Law? 
Because of being without fault.' is the abuse of right itself 
recognized as a lawful execution of right? Or， though the abuse 
of right al ways exists in such case， isthere an another reason 
for the exempiion of the 1iability which is due to a non-existence of 
fault? 
The白expression・'violationof rights" in Artic1e、709，as already 
stated professor 8ueka wa， ought to be understood as the "symbol 
of unla wfulI1essぺ Unlawfulness(violation of law) may be grasped 
only objectively as a violation of a legaf order. Then， 1.he concrete 
rea1ization' of such violationof law is， insphere of 1.he civillaw， 
the arising of an unbearable damage， as stated previously. 80 
the execution of right which eaused such damage， i. e. the abuse 
of right， can not be exempted of its character of， abusiveness 
because of the state of mind of the doer.τhen， though the existence 
of the abuse of rights itself may be recognized， should the liabi1ity 
to 1.he compensa tion be exempted' beca use . ofreasons other than a 
non-existence of fault? If so， in a system of 'Civi1 Law which 
does not permit the abuse' 'of rights， there must be another 
principle to protect the doer when rights is abrtsed， but in the 
Civi1 La w or theoretically the existerice of such principles can 
not be recognized， a'nd therefore such interpretaiion is not 
pertinent. If it is so， when we consider an interpretaiion oI Artic1e 
709 'in relation to Artic1e 1， even if thedoer may be without 
intention or fault， once such unbearable damage. is caused，there 
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is no theoretical ground for the-e~emption of 1iabi1ity to the 
compensation. How~ver， 1S it appropriate as an interpretation 
Qf Artic1e 709 with refe1'ence to its literary expressions? How is 
it possible to obtain an interpretation which 1S not contradictory 
between Artic1es 1 and -709? In this -respect the五rstpossible 
interpretation is that， although a damage has been ca1，sed， ifthe 
doer is without fault， there is not an abuse of; right and such 
understanding about rights is the theoretical conception of rights 
agreeing with the public welfare. And there is no formal logical 
contradiction in such interpretation， buton the other hand， on the 
side of the victim who is also a mernbe1' of civil society just as 
the doer-is， such interpretation is contradictory to the 1'ecognition 
of right that prohibits an infringement upon profi.ts， belonging 
to a person， without 1'eason. For， wheiher the victim ought to 
endure the damage 01' is able to c1aim a compensation depends solely 
upon the subjective state of -manner on the side of the doer. 
When the society recognizes equal rights for each individual， the 
scope and 1imit of rights may be determined objectively. Then 
the determination of-it by the sUbjective state of manne1' on the 
side of others is contrary to the signifi.cance of social recagnition 
of equal rights fo1' each individua1. Therefo1'e. atleast， itseems 
that， the exemption from liability to the compensation by reason 
that it is an inevitable result of the lawful execution of -rights 
to cause a damage without fault， does-not agree with the nature 
of rights which submits to the true public welfare. 
Then， the second interpretation maybe considered. It is to 
recognize relatively and not absolutely-the lega1ity 01' the possi-
bi1ity of exemption f1'om liabi1ity for the fore-mentioned act of a 
doer without fault. 
It is the. basis of this opinion that， in comp1icated modern 
society， there a1'8 cases in which the execution of rights of an 
individual inevitably col1ides with the rights of others owing to 
the competitive existence of individual right， so an infiiction of 
damage of somedegree is unavoidable. -And， -if.the damage is 
caused by the execution of rights by a personwithin a bearable 
degree jUdged from the “pub1ic order 01" good moraland custom" 
in the modern social life， there is no abuse ofrights， but if the 
degree of damage exceeds such 1imit， there is it. It is necessary to 
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disCl1S this opinion from two sides. At五rst，in to1't which is caused 
byan execl1tion of 1'ight， without fa111t， in the modern social1ife， 
the1'e is an objective 1imit concerning whether the act is lawful 
or unlawful (or abuse). If this is so， within this objective 1imit， 
althol1gh the infringement is caused not only without fault but 
also with intention， this act Sh0111d not be an l1nlawful execution 
of Tights and consequently withol1t liabi1ity to the compensation. 
The1'efo1'e， this is no more a problem of absol11te 1iability but only a 
problem of the limit of abl1se of right. And since this limit is 
determined objectively from social norm-consciol1sness， the con-
c1usion has no relation with the existence Or non-existence of 
doer's fault， so this gives no solution to the present problem. 
Secondly， ifthe 1imit is not to be determined objectively， and if 
there is a difference in the scope of lega1itγin the execution of 
rights， owing to the existence or non-existence of an intention or 
a fault， then compared with to the' preceding interpretation which 
recognizes in principle an absolute exemption from liabi1ity in case 
without fault， there is after all the di百erenceonly in degree. The 
existence or non-e玄istenceof an abl1se of right is exc111sively 
dete1'mined by the sl1bjective conditioris of the doe1'， simila1'ly in 
both cases. It ml1st be said that this inte1'p1'etation is， therefo1'e， 
l1nsuitable. 
It is my opinion， since whether there is an abuse of right or 
not must be considered by the conception of rights which 1 have 
stated above， itdoes not depend upon the subjective state of 
manne1' of the doer but upon the objective result， the a1'ising of 
an l1hbeaatble damage' 01' the actual uneasiness of this arising. 
And then the liabi1ity Sh0111d also be determined objectively. Then， 
“intention" 01' “fa11t (negligence)" in Artic1e 709， as an element 
of responsibi1ity， should not be aCknowledged as a pl1'e subjective 
element but also as an objective one. The te1'm “fault" may be 
defined thus: when a person execl1tes his ‘rights and an un-
bea1'able damage is caused， although he had taken a precaution 
to avoid an infliction of damage upon others， itSh0111d be judged 
that the1'e isa “fault". . Th~refore， the term，“the cas~， in which 
lawfully p1'otected pro五tsof others has been damaged with intention 
01' fa11t (i. e. the case of violation of rights as in Artic1e 709)ヘ
may be properly undersiood not as the case in which a damage 
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is inflicted upon others by force overpoweTing the confrol of the 
doer's wi1， in otbei words by “force majeure"， but as the case 
in which an “unbearable damage" is inf1ided through the act 
selected and determined by the doe1"s own wi1. If in case the 
doe1' executes his own rights， he has. the . 1'esponsibi1ity to be 
. cautious and to attempt not to inf1ict damage on others， and when 
an “unbearable damage" is caused in despite of the p1'ecautions， 
then it may be 1'ecognized that， in . the legal sense， the1'e is the 
“fault". The 1'eason to acknowledge the existence of "fau1t" 
(a cause of the legal1'ep1'ehension) in this case lies in the fact 
that gene1'al1y a pe1'son， the doe1'， is able to always control his 
own act 01' manner f1'eely by his own wi1l. The1'efo1'e， to place 
himself in aposition inf1icting damages on othe1's may be conside1'ed 
none othe1' than the result of the selection and dete1'mination 
of his own wil1. On the othe1' hand， since the act 01' manne1' 
'p1'essed by the “fo1'ce 'majeu1'e" is that which was not dete1'mined 
by one's own wi1， it may be interpreted that damages caused by 
itmay not be 1'ecognized as a 1'esult of an act of the doe1'， which 
is due to the intention 01' fault of the pe1'son 1'esponsible fo1' the 
act. Consequently， if the case of“fo1'ce majeu1'e" 01' “fault of 
the victim" is put aside， itis possible to ext1'act the fal10wing 
te1'ms f1'om Artic1e 709. That is “the fault of the doe1' always 
exists when an unbea1'abledamage has been caused ぺ
In civil 1'esposibi1ity， unlike criminal responsibi1ify， • ifa fati1t 
does not cause damages， it can not be an object of 1'ep1'ehension， 
so a fault may become an object of 1'ep1'ehension only when the 
damage has been caused as a 1'esult of the act 01' manne1' of the 
pe1'son responsible fo1' the act. Thus， it is app1'opriate to inte1'p1'et 
the concept of fault as such objective matte1'， and it is unnecessa1'y 
to look upon it as subjective matte1' as that the p1'ecaution which 
should have been taken was neglected， and now， itmust be inte1'-
p1'eted anly in this maIine1' in 1'elation to A1'tic1e 1. 
There is. an old saying of Roman Law that "pe1'son who 
executes his right does riotharm any pe1'son" 01' H daes not act 
unlawful1y to any pe1'son". This saying at五1'stmeant that， as 
long as it is the execution of right8， itwill not be an infringement 
to othe1'8， 80 the1'e can be no tort8. But natu1'ally， it is possible 
ta do an infringement of 1'ights 01' unlawful doing or to1'ts on the 
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process of execution..of rights. .Therefore， itdoes not necessari1y 
produce lawfull results alone through the formal execution. of 
rights. So Capitant i:q.terpreted the meaning of thissaying as such， 
“the person who executes his rights with much 、precautiondoes 
not infringe anyone". (1). However; he seems to have， interpreted， 
that if rights are executed with much. precaution， even though it 
may cause unbearable damages on. others， such doing should not 
be repr叶lendeand everybody should endure the damage， and 
therefo1'e it is not unlawful. He recognized that it is unlawful 
wheu the executiou of rights breaks a ce:itain limit， 'aud the mark 
of the limit is found such in a subjective element， as. that“whether 
the .precaution has beeu takeu: or not". . He seems. to think， 
ultimately， that the reprehension of law should be focussed on the 
manuer of the person respousible. for the act. But， for iustauce，‘if 
a precaution had uot beeu takeu， as 1οug as there is no resultiug 
uubearable'damage， there is uo ascription of liabi1ity.to the compeu-
sation as. a civilliabi1ity. What does this mean? It meaus that，. iu 
the repreheusi on of la w as. the ascriptiou of civi1 liability，. the 
carefulness 01' the carelessuess' is .uot . the五rstcriteriou at least. 
'If it is so， simi1arto the case of an iufringement by carelessuess， 
iu the. case of. au infringement by very prudent acts， ifthe damage 
is so large that.j主主respassesthe . social uubea1'able limits， it. is 
natural that fo1' the moment such infringmeut is cousidered as 
au object of the reprehension as a civi1 liabi1ity，. as long as it is 
uot a case especially to be deuied of its unla wfulness by‘law. So 
thepreceeding Romau sayiug should. be iuterpreted 8uch as，“only 
a pel'SOU who executes his rights without iuflictiug damages， which 
are social1y uubearable， does not iufriuge. upon other.s， iu other 
words， does not aCt uu1awfully". However， eveu in sl，1Ch case， there 
sti1 remains the problem whethe1' “without fault'~ is or is uot a 
conditiou.of an exemption .of the liabi1ity. 
1u my opinion， itis believed that whether the. damage is 
bearable or .11ubearable must be determined objectively and social1y. 
This 1imit is simultaueously the 1imit of. whethe1' the executiou of 
rights is la wful 01' uot， the latte1' case is that of an abuse of. 1'ights. 
It is the fuudameutal priuciple of ou1' present civil law that， as 
。CoJinet. Capitant， Coursるlementaire.p. 383.， 
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Iong as there is an abuse of rights， there is an unlawfulness and 
a・liabi1ityfor torts. And so， as Artic1e 709 is not an exceptional 
regulation of the civil Iaw concerning the fundamental principle 
of an ascription of responsibi1i1:y， the artic1e must be inferpreted 
to agree with this principle. Therefore， the coIicept of fault should 
be . bui1t so that in such case there is al ways the fault. On the 
contrary， itseems possible to take the attitude 1:0 defend to the 
end the tradition of the principle of "liabi1ity with fault"， by 
reeognition of Artic1e 709 as an exceptional regulation， but there 
are no rational and theoretical grounds why faultless act should 
be the cause of the exemption of liabi1ity， whi1e there is an abuse 
of rights. Naturally， inthis case， whatever be the rational grounds， 
the fact that “intention " .and“neg1igence" or “fault" is given 
as the condition for the .liabi1ity in Artic1e 709 itse1f may be 
considered as a potent ground for the c1aim. But， in my opinion， 
the sentence that if there is no "intentioI1" or "fault" there is 
no Iiabi1ity meansat least there are no ground for the legal 
reprehension. It does not means that even when there is some 
unlawfulness Or the ground of the legal reprehension the Habi1ity 
should be exempted as long as there is no fault， but it means that， 
in case of faultless， there is no ground for legal reprehension or 
the illegality. This does not， however， agree with the present theory 
of abuse of rights. Under the principles of civi1 law， prohibiting 
the abuse of rights， itis natural to recognize a 1iabi1ity to compen-
sation， when there is an unlawful (unbearable) damage. Therefore， 
it is stil1 weak in its reason to admit that the traditional principle 
on the liabi1ity for torts， recognizing no liabi1ity as long as there 
is no fault， should be considered as a special rule of this principle. 
Historically， however， there were times when such interpretations 
was held to have been in harmony with the idea of the abuse of 
rights. This is true under the conception that the abuse of rights 
does not exist if the person with right execl，1tes his right without 
an intention to inflict others. But it does not harmonize with the 
present conception of the abuse of rithts， because the concept of 
Tights itself have made progress and historical changes. Thus， 
considered from the standpoint of historkal development， itmust 
be understood that Artic1e 709 should be subordinate to ArticIe 
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that， ultimately，“person with fault" in Artic1e 709 is “one who 
acted under the selection and determination by his free wi1l， and 
has inflicted an unbearable damage to others. Therefore， the con-
cept of fault， set previously， should not be thought as a permanent 
immovable; but rather， in Artic1e 709， the concept of fault must 
be interpreted in harmony with the whole system of civil law， 
es会eciallywith Article 1， and with the fundamental principles of 
social order. By such interpretation， we can understand the civi1 
liabi1ity as the pure independent civi1 liabi1ity free from the 
character of punishment as in the criminal liabi1ity which focusses 
a reprehension to the mental attitude (1). The preceding Roman 
saying has also been and is concretely interpreted in various ways 
with historical changes. But to decide whether there 'was an 
unlawfulness or i1ot， and then whether a liabi1ity exists or not 
in relation with the execution of rights， isa proper way of dea1ing 
with the problem of' civi1 liability， as a compensation of damage. 
It is， therefore， the correct ，method，. logical1y， to understand an 
unlawfulness or a liability according to the changes of the concept 
of right， and it is believed that the. principle of liabi1ity with 
faults itself， should be undertood also in connection with the 
historical changes of the concept of rights. 
If we see in such manner， although Artic1e 7090f the Civi1 
La w shows formally the traditional pl'・incipleof 1iability with fault 
since the' Roman law， the interpretation that there mustalso be 
the 1iabi1ity for the damage which may. be caused without fault， 
may be introduced from no' other than the provision of Article 
709 itself， in relation to Artic1e 1.， And it seems that while 
such interpretation was already possible theoretical1y (2)， the 
appropriateness of this interpretation hasbecome decisive by the 
introduction of Artic1e 1 after the. war. And it is a progressive 
interpretation in response. to the request for' the recognition 
of liability without fault， which has risen rapidly with the 
development of moderen enterprises. It is also the concrete rea1iza-
tion，within tlie law of torts， of the amendment of the civi1 law， 
which is to c1arify at. present the. scope and 1imits of 'personal 
1) On the relation of the civil Iiability and unlawfulness， s巴e.my“1、1巴oryof Torts" 
(1950， Tokyo). 
2) M. Ishimoto， Study on Civil 'Liability (1948，"Tokyo). 
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rights and is to prohibit an abuse of rights especially through 
Artic1e 1 of the Civil La w. It is definitely not a dogmatism nor 
a caprIee on the part of the interpreter to interprete. Artic1e 709 
cOri.sequently contrary to the interpretation， which has traditional1y 
considered Article 709 as the principle of liabi1ity ・withfault， stand-
ing ori .the tradition of the Roman principle， but rather，. it is an 
inevitable result of the introduction of Artic1e 1 of the Civi1 Law. 
MethodiCaI1y， the interpretation of .1aw should always be to c1arify 
the historical signi五canceof the text of the 1a w and to agree as 
much as possible with the objective norm-consciousness of the 
8ociety; which has been discerned (1). In that case， the wi1 of 
the legislator shal1 natural1y be referential， but we should not be 
restricied by it， because the law， as a norm， can bemaintained 
only by the objective wi1 of the society， which seeks to secure 
and assist the peace and harmony of the society under the his-
torical conditions of the period in which the law exists. It means 
that law should always be the method by which the realization 
of the social purposes of the era is gained， and the human should 
not be the method at al for the la w itself. It may be explained 
as following. With the development of modern society， the liabi1ity 
with fault had been the guiding principle of the liabi1ity for torts. 
But with development of modern large. enterprises we have been 
led to recognize the great exception to the principle. And from 
the social norm.consciousness， it8eems that， as long as one had 
caused a damage by an act or manner determined by his own wi1， 
although the act of infringement may be. without fault， he should 
bear to some ex~ent the damage which isdue to th~ result.of the 
act， or at least bear a part of damage， as the party concerned， 
considering the degree of precautions taken by the victim. There 
are， naturally， many cases， which cannot be decided equally， in 
the actual society of transactiops， in which a body of enterprise 
used to give some 8ort. of indemnity to .victims for damages， 
caused by the enterprise without. fault， and many examples of 
cases in which individuals t，Ised to give some sort of indemnity 
to victims for damages. caused by him without fault. Moreover， 
it is not merely the indiyid包albut social norm‘consciousness to 
1) M. Ishimoto， Logic in Law (1947， Tokyo). 
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support such acts as rationa1. Such actual circumstances demanded 
the liabi1ity of enterprises， and even in the academic circles its 
appropriateness has been recognized; and .various legislations have 
been produced on this principle. However， the traditional con-
sciousness on the principle of liability with fault in the academic 
circ1es also hestitated to urge the establishment of the theory which 
wi1 move the principle of Article 709 of the Civi1 La w. But in the 
interpretation of law， not only the literal and logical but also the 
historical interpretation of its. signi五cancewhich. al ways lead to 
find the actual social norm-consciousness， is needed. And such 
an actual norm-com:ciousness and the modern concept of rights 
becomes a powerful guide in the interpretation of Artic1e 709.Such 
demands， existing heretofore， have been induced not only theore-
tical1y but also positively to construct such theol'γby the introduc-
tion of Artic1e 1. Such interpretation is indeed super五cially
contradictory to the legislative mind of Artic1e 709. But the fact 
that it must be recognized， isdue to the introduction of Artic1e 1. 
There is a gap of 50 years in the history' of Civi1Law between 
Artic1e 709 and Artic1e 1， and it is indeed this gap which makes it 
possible for Artic1e 1 tode白lethe modern. signific8nce of Artic1e 709 
as above. 
For such conclusion， the following question may be given from 
a di百erentstandpoint. 1t is the question that to expand and 
recognize the meaning of the 1iability without fault may be at 
present contrary to the progress of culture. Observed from the 
view-point of the historical progress of the civi1 1iabi1ity， since 
the 1iability without fault had developed gradually into the 1iabi1ity 
with fault， itis inferable that a refined concept of“fault" may 
be a product、oflegal cultural progress. Then， such thought may 
be true， viewed from the development of the concept of the so-called 
“fault" itself. 1t rnay be appropriate to reveal the characteristics 
of both principles， by saying that the principles of ancient times 
are principles without fault and those of modern times are princi-
ples with fault. However， itis able to be said that the old 
principle was also the principle with fault. In the old 1iabi1ity 
without fault， ifth~re al'e acts of infringement， they are all 
misconducts by which the responsibi1ity should be ascribed t01 the 
doer， and in the act of infringement the evi1 intentio 
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presumed.ln this respect， the act of infringement itself was 
an infringemenf with intention， and at least had been reprehended 
as an infringement. with fault. However， the reason for the 
exemption cif the 1iabi1ity which has been recognized sinceold 
.time， is“force'majeure". Therefore it can be said that the 1iabi1ity 
、withoutfault of ancient period was not a liabi1ity for an infringement 
without fault but rather the strict liabi1ity with fault. The present 
concept of fault is the result 'of the so1idi五cation、ofsuch wide 
1iめilitywith fau1t， in the processof the gradual臼中andingof 
'the scope of the exemption of responsibi1ity. This process is also 
that of a discriminating by law of the scope in which al result 
can be control1ed by the action of persons from the 8cope in 
which it can not be 'controlled， in short the' scope responding to 
the “force majeure"~ ， If conceived i:ri this manner， to de五nethe 
concept of fault as such， does not contradict at al with the history 
of cu1ture. The wide recognition' of the liabi1ity without fault is 
merely the result of the consideration on the prerriise of the fau1t， 
'which is understood today. The essence of this problem is conse~ 
quent1y a problem of how the fault is to be legally idealized. The 
principle of the liability with fault has not developed from the 
principle of the liabi1ity. without fault， but the concept of fault 
itself has' developed within the pririciple of the liabi1ity with fault. 
And 1 have， at present， attempted fo 'interprete this concept of 
fault as given above. 
On the other hand， the method of the legnl determinntion of 
the ascription of liabi1ity by the determination of the existence 
and non‘existence of fault under the supposition of “reasonable 
man" Or“standard man" since the school of Roman law， mny 
be considered as the most excellent form of the legal thought on 
'the civil 1iabi1ity， because it c1arifi.es the meaning of the scope of 
the control by personal acts as above， My opinion on this point 
is as foI1owing. Originally， concerning the act of infringement， there 
is the civi1iabi1ity and the criminalliability. These are absolutely 
different， but are common as the legal reprehension. And， since 
the essence of， civi1 liabi1ity is the compensation for damage， if
damage is to be compensated in some way， there is no reason 
why the assailant must al ways necessari1y bear al1 of the com-
pensation by himself. When the damage is insured， and the 1iability 
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of the assailant， which is a legal reprehension towards the assai1ant， 
actually diminished， there is no irrationality. Therefore， in a 
society which is not under such a system，the reprehension is 
focussed completely 011 the assi1aht and the liabi1ity lies on him. 
Also the allotment of damage between the assai1ant and the victim， 
based on the impartial social opinion for the compensa tion of the 
damage， becomes a problem. Contrarily， the legal reprehension 1S 
~focussed on the state of manner of the assailant in the criminal 
liabi1ity. In ihe civi1 liabi1ity， the fact or result which has caused 
an t1nbearable damage is reprehended， but in the criminal 1iabi1ity 
the act of person is reprehended; In the former， as long as no 
damage is caused， even the Intentional act is not reprehended， but 
in the latter， even an unaccomplished 0旺enceis reprehended. It 
mayalso be considered that， in civil liabi1ity， once an unbearable 
damage has been caused; the attitude of the doer is simultaneou:sly 
reprehended together with it， but if a third person bears the 1iability 
to compensation for the damage， then the assai1ant is free from 
anY reprehension by law. This means that in the civil liability 
the reprehension by law is not turned towards the attitude of the 
doer， but essentially it is turned only to the fact of damage. On 
the contrary， inthe criminal liabi1ity， it.is impossible for a third 
person io beal' the punishment in place of the assai1ant. As it is 
wel1 knowri， the liabi1ity fOr torts developed as a civil liabi1ity 
inc1uding the element of criminal liabi1ity and entangling with it， 
and the concept of fault have developed belonging to the side of 
the criminal liabi1ity. The fact that the fault is sti1 an element 
of the modern civi1 liabi1ity is due tothe fact that the separation 
of the two has not reached to the五nalstage， and also due to the 
constitution of modern civil law in which the compensation for 
damage is realized in the form of the direct relation， from wrongdoer 
to victim. In this sense， the tint of criminal liability sti1 remains 
in the civi1 liabi1ity， and only by the removal of this tint， that is， 
by removal of the previous concept of fau:lt， itis possible to develope 
an pure independent' civi1 liabi1ity， and simultaneously the fault 
should be interpreted as it was explained in the preceding 
sections. This is also an inevitable .result in the development of 
civi1 liability. Only in this way， itis possible that t 
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liabi1ity without fault. shal1 be systematized as a civi1liabi1ity and 
shall be expluined that it. is not essentially di丘erentfrom liabi1ity 
for torts in civi1 la w. 
IV. 
'The interpretation of ArticIe 709' of the Civi1 Law; as given 
above， may seem to be 'very queer from the legal idea of the principle 
of liability with fault， which has been cultivated for half a century 
since ihe establishment of the Civi1 Law Code and has become a 
tradition. In this respeet， such interpretation may be considered 
to be very revolutionary， but if there is no absurdity in its logical 
treatment and if the concIusion obtained is logically an inevitable 
result， such an interpretation of law may not be concIuded as being 
revolutionary in an academic sense. Moreover， such ?-n interpreta-
tion has been recognized in Europe for more than half a century， 
and is also supported by the norm.eonsciousness of modern society. 
Now. as manyyears have passed since our society entered into 
the group of modern' societies， such an interpretation is not an 
attempt going too far ahead. but rather seems to be an attempt 
too slow in coming. What hindered the appearance of such an 
interpretation? It was， of course， the thoughts of absolutism of 
rights. It is natural that the Iegislative thought of the Meiji era， 
in which a modern nation was born by crushing the feuda1ism， had 
aCknowledged the absoluteness of the right of the， citizens as the 
ground and central pi1ar of social structure. Based on this idea， 
it is also natural that the principle of the 1iabi1ity with fault was 
recognized as the guiding principle of the civi1 law. And the de. 
velopment of society and the backwardness of civi1 la w in this 
country are the cause of the attempi of this new interpretation 
as given above. But the introduction of ArticIe 1 of the Civi1 Law 
means that the thought of the relativity of rights， which developed 
in the background of our science of civi11aw， has now gained， as a 
principle， the initiative position. It is most pertinent at this moment 
to renew the reflection and understanding toward the whole system 
of civi1 law and to attempt further theoretical developlment. 
The fore-mentioned theory is' a new interpretation to myself， 
but it is also， on the other hand， an inevitable result of the 
development of my previoustheory. My attitude maintained 
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throughout the developrnent of such theory was not only the 
interpretation of law on the basis of the already estab1ished 
also principles， but also the interpretation based ort the.spirit of law. 
It is conceivable to rne that the spirit is al ways rnuch rnore living 
and developable and historical than rnere principles. The true 
spirit to respect old' traditions is sirnultaneously the spirit to 
develope and revol'1.tionize the tradition. If the spirit is confined 
within traditions， and the tl'aditional is suppressing the spirit itself， 
then to 1ive on tradition 1S be1ieved to be leaning on the lifeless 
corpse of the past. And we can not expect the developrnent of 
the tradition any more， and the historical aspect， which is the 
most essential factor in tradition， shall be denied. Then con. 
sequently， itis no more a living tradition. However， the living 
spirit always lives within the tradition and creates a new tradi-
tion itself_ It seems to me， of CO'l.1rse， that there are many points 
to be criticized in the detai1s of my interpretation mentioned above， 
b'l.1t 1 have made clear that， ifthe problem is grasped in a most 
fundamental form， and be consolidated theoretically from al sides， 
such conc1usion shall be inevitablly attained. And 1 believe that 
by pUl割lingsuch method of thinking， at least a path to a new 
theoretical structure shall be opened， whi1e su伍cientlygiving 
respect to the old theoretical inheritance. 
THE END 
